Silvio Seno Chibeni
Abstract:
This paper reviews
briefly Kuhn’s conception of science, in contrast with the traditional
conception, arguing then that Spiritism ¾ such as established
by Allan Kardec ¾ constitutes a genuine
scientific paradigm. It is further claimed that the normal science tradition of
the Kardequian paradigm remains unrivalled as a scientific guide to the study
of the spiritist phenomena.
1.
Introduction
Philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that treats of
scientific knowledge: its foundations, evolution, specificity, scope, etc. In
the present work we shall be particularly interested in the issue of the
so-called “demarcation criterion”. It is generally admitted that scientific
knowledge demarcates itself from other forms of knowledge by certain specific
features. To determine what, if any, these features are has constituted a major
challenge for philosophers, at least since the inception of modern science, in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In his pioneering philosophical
analysis of science, Francis Bacon submitted that it was the adoption of a
special method, the scientific method,
which differentiated science from non-science and pseudo-science. In philosophy
of science, the description of the scientific method given by Bacon survived,
with some alterations, until approximately the middle of our century, and is
still widely adopted by laymen and scientists.
It is beyond the scope of this article to present in detail this
classical conception of science, as well as the historical and philosophical
criticisms that led to its abandonment. In broad outline, the traditional view
of science assumes that a scientific discipline begins with a long process of
pure observation. From the data thus collected general laws governing the
phenomena are then extracted. A scientific theory is an ensemble of such laws,
concerning a determinate field of phenomena. Science progresses by the addition
of new experimental data and new laws to the existing theories.
In the view thus sketched, the following assumptions are essential: 1)
No theoretical hypotheses whatsoever are allowed to intervene in the
data-collecting period: the observations should be theoretically neutral. 2)
Likewise, the laws should be extracted from the observational basis by
objective, theoretically neutral methods. 3) The new laws discovered along the
evolution of a science are always complementary to, and never incompatible
with, the laws already established.
The most rigorous elaboration of the classical conception of science was
undertaken by the philosophical programme called logical positivism, which flourished from 1920 to 1940,
approximately. This programme reached a high level of formal and theoretical
sophistication, and exerted a profound and lasting influence upon the
scientific community. Already in 1934, however, the basic tenets of logical
positivism were vigorously attacked by a yet unknown philosopher, Karl Popper,
in a book that remained virtually ignored for more than two decades. In the
late fifties, when the logical positivist programme was already weakened by a
sustained process of self-criticism, and Popper’s work was translated into
English (The Logic of Scientific
Discovery), it became clear that the traditional view of science was no
longer tenable.
Here again we lack space to present the arguments levelled by Popper
against logical positivism, as well as his new conception of science, known as falseationism. We remark only that the
Popperian theses run, in their turn, into severe difficulties, pointed out by
several philosophers of science, notably Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Paul
Feyerabend.[2]
We have discussed elsewhere (Chibeni 1984, 1988 and 1991) the issue of
the spiritist science in connection with Lakatos’s philosophy of science. This
same issue will be now analysed in the light of the Kuhnian philosophical
ideas. To be fully accomplished, however, this undertaking would require a
detailed exposition to the Kuhnian and Kardequian theories, which evidently
cannot be made within the restricted limits of an article. The sequel should
therefore be taken only as an outline and invitation to further research. We
shall begin by reviewing some of the basic concepts and proposals put forward
by Thomas Kuhn.
2. A sketch
of the Kuhnian philosophy of science
Kuhn began his academic career as a theoretical physicist, and
afterwards became interested in history of science. Undertaking important
historical research from the perspective of a new historiographical tradition,
according to which past scientific theories should be analysed in their own
scientific context, Kuhn realised that the traditional conception of science
did not at all match with the actual process of genesis and evolution of the
theories of mature sciences (physics, chemistry). Such a perception of the
historical inadequacy of the current opinions concerning the nature of science
led him finally to philosophy of science. His studies in this field were first
published in a systematic way in his book of 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which had a profound
influence on the development of philosophy of science. In a language apparently
accessible to the non-specialist, Kuhn advances in this book several
sophisticated epistemological theses about scientific knowledge, that soon
became object of hot debate amongst philosophers. We cannot evidently enter
into these technical discussions here, but shall attempt at a simplified
exposition of some of the most widely accepted contributions of this American
philosopher.
Kuhn’s theory of science spins around the thesis that the typical
development of a scientific discipline occurs according to the following open
structure:
pre-paradigmatic phase ® normal science ® crisis ® revolution ® new normal science ® new crisis ® new revolution ® ...
The pre-paradigmatic phase represents, so to speak, the “pre-history” of
a science, that period in which reigns a wide disagreement amongst the
researchers, or groups of researchers, about fundamental topics such as: what
phenomena should be explained, and according to which theoretical principles;
what are the relations of the theoretical principles one with another and with
theories of neighbouring domains; what methods and values should guide the
search of new phenomena and new principles; what techniques and instruments can
be utilised, etc. Whilst such a state of affairs persists, the discipline
cannot be said to be truly scientific.
A discipline becomes scientific when it acquires a scientific paradigm, capable of putting an end to
the generalised and deep-reaching disagreements of its initial period. The term
‘paradigm’ has several meanings in Kuhn’s book, and we cannot discuss its
intricacies here. In its original, pre-Kuhnian signification, the term means
‘example’, ‘model’, as used, for instance, in grammar. Kuhn keeps part of this meaning when he proposes that the
transition to the scientific period requires the acknowledgement, from the part
of the community of researchers, of an exemplary scientific achievement
settling the issues at dispute in the pre-paradigmatic phase. Aristotle’s
mechanics, Newton’s optics, Boyle’s chemistry, Franklin’s electricity theory
are some of the examples given by Kuhn of paradigms that promoted the
respective disciplines to the category of sciences.
It is not easy to explicit (specially in a few sentences) the elements
that form a Kuhnian paradigm. Kuhn even claims that such an explication can
never be complete, because the knowledge of a paradigm is partially tacit, acquired by direct acquaintance
with the way of doing science determined by the paradigm. Thus, it is only by doing optics in the way Newton did, or
electromagnetism in the way Maxwell did that one can know exactly the paradigms
of Newtonian optics and of electromagnetism, for instance. However, we can
mention, as integral parts of a paradigm: 1) an ontology, indicating the kind
of things which constitutes reality; 2) fundamental theoretical principles,
specifying the laws which regulate the behaviour of these things; 3) auxiliary
theoretical principles, establishing the connections of the basic principles
with the phenomena, as well as with theories of contiguous domains; 4)
methodological rules, standards and values, directing the further articulation
of the paradigm; 5) concrete examples of application of the theory to the
facts, etc.
A paradigm provides then the foundations upon which the scientific
community works. It represents a “map” to be used by the scientists in the
exploration of Nature. Research firmly grounded on the theories, methods and
examples of a paradigm is called normal
science by Kuhn. Normal science aims to extend the knowledge of the facts
that the paradigm identifies as relevant, by further elaboration of the theory
and by more accurate observations.
Normal science is a highly directed and, in a sense, selective activity.
This is essential to the development of science, as Kuhn has shown. It is only
by focusing their attention on a selected range of phenomena and explanatory
theoretical principles that the scientists succeed in going deep in the study
of Nature. No scientific research is possible without the guidance of a body of
theoretical and methodological principles: they allow the selection,
understanding and evaluation of what is observed. One of the main mistakes of
the classical conception of science was precisely the belief that the process
of observation can, and should, be theoretically neutral. It is acknowledged
today that facts and theories are closely interdependent. There is a kind of “symbiosis” between them: facts give support
to the theories, and theories make possible their classification,
concatenation, prediction and explanation. Working under the direction of a
paradigm the scientist need not constantly reconstruct the foundations of his field,
explain the meaning and usefulness of the concepts he uses, and justify the
observations he chooses to make.
Kuhn describes normal science as a “puzzle-solving” activity. It
presupposes well-defined rules, like ordinary puzzles. It may happen that along
the development of a paradigm some of the puzzles posed by Nature prove to be
hard to solve. The scientists duty is to insist in the rules and basic
principles of the paradigm. In the same way as in a jigsaw puzzle, for example,
to cut off a non-fitting edge of a piece is not a valid move, in normal science
the fundamental laws and standards should not be abandoned or mutilated when a
problem is tackled. Kuhn emphasises that as long as the paradigm experiences no
serious and generalised failures the scientists should hold fast their
commitment to the paradigm. The progress of science requires that paradigms
should not be too lightly abandoned. All paradigms, specially in their initial
periods, face difficulties, and a certain amount of conservatism is necessary
to give them time to exhibit their full strength.
But this calculated tolerance should have a limit, of course. When
unsolved puzzles ¾ called anomalies by Kuhn ¾ do not yield to the best efforts of
the best scientists for a long time, and furthermore strike on vital areas of
the paradigm, the time is ripe to considering the substitution of the whole
paradigm. In such situations of crisis,
the most daring and creative members of the scientific community come out with
alternative paradigms. Once the confidence on the dominant paradigm is lost,
such alternatives become appealing to a
growing number of scientists. Discussions and disagreements over fundamentals
resembling those of the pre-paradigmatic phase take place, with the difference
that during a crisis the old paradigm continues to guide research until a
better paradigm is clearly at hand.
When a new paradigm is finally adopted, science will have undergone what
Kuhn calls a scientific revolution.
The most controversial theses put forward by Kuhn concern scientific
revolutions. For our purposes here, however, we fortunately need not occupy
ourselves with this complex philosophical issue. The analysis of Spiritism to
be developed in the following section will hinge only on the general schema of
the nature of science reproduced above, which is generally agreed by
contemporary philosophers of science.
3. The
spiritist paradigm
The reader acquainted with the history of Spiritism and who has read,
analysed and understood the contributions of Allan Kardec will perhaps readily
grant our two main theses: Kardec’s work constitutes a genuine scientific
paradigm, and this paradigm represents till our days the only secure path along
which scientific research of spirit can be conducted. The complete explication and
justification of these claims would require a complete exposition and analysis
of Spiritism and of the alternative proposals of study of the spiritist
phenomena that have arisen since Kardec’s time. Such an undertaking cannot
evidently be carried out here. We shall only indicate some salient points, in
the hope of motivating those who may wish to inquire further into this issue.
As Kardec himself repeatedly observed, some of the most conspicuous
facts that founded his research were already known, although imprecisely and
obscurely, since the earliest times of human civilisation. Notwithstanding
their having cast the interest of individuals and doctrines, until the
inception of Spiritism there was no scientific
paradigm capable of integrating them in an encompassing, precise and objective
theory. It was the pre-paradigmatic period of the spirit research. Allan Kardec
has put an end to this period. He proposed the first well-grounded theory of
the spiritist phenomena. Besides the explanatory theory properly considered,
Spiritism as formulated by Kardec provides a set of methods, criteria and
values to guide the development of theory and experience. The Kardequian
paradigm is admirably coherent and encompassing, empirically adequate and
heuristically fertile, ranking, in its field, with the most successful
paradigms of ordinary academic sciences, such as thermodynamics,
electromagnetism, relativity and quantum theories, etc.
In an approximate indication, we can say that The Spirits’ Book establishes the ontology and the fundamental
theoretical principles of Spiritism. The
Medium’s Book links the theory with the experimental basis. The Gospel According to the Spiritism and
Heaven and Hell develop the
philosophical implications of the paradigm. The
Genesis, Miracles and Predictions According to the Spiritism and many
essays published in the Revue Spirite and
in the Posthumous Works provide
in-depth analyses of several theoretical issues. The Revue also represents a rich repository of experimental reports.
Besides the theory and methods of the spiritist science, Kardec offered us a
wealth of concrete examples of application of the theory in the explanation of
phenomena and in the resolution of long-lasting philosophical problems
concerning human nature. We can see, in consonance with Kuhn’s ideas, that such
puzzle-solving models play an important role in the understanding of the real
essence of Spiritism. Those who have not delved into them will always be
incapable of a correct judgement of Spiritism. A purely “external” view of the
theory does not afford the important tacit knowledge of the spiritist science.
Oddly enough, the virtual totality of the critics of Spiritism cannot even
claim a perfunctory knowledge of its theory.
It is very important to remark that the pioneering work of Kardec does
not represent a closed system, but the foundations from which the spiritist
science proceeds in its continuous advance. As it is well known, the spiritist
paradigm has been developed in important respects by several researchers, in a
solid tradition of normal science. To mention just a few, Léon Denis and
Gabriel Dellane in earlier times, and later Bezerra de Menezes, Emmanuel, André
Luiz, Yvonne Pereira and Philomeno de Miranda have greatly contributed to the
extension and deepening of the spiritist paradigm, without any violation of its
fundamental principles and standards.
History of science indicates that revolutions have occurred in almost
all scientific disciplines. Someone may raise the question whether the
spiritist paradigm does not, or will not need to be replaced. This is a rather
complex issue, and limitations of space do not allow us to analyse it
thoroughly here. However, we would like to sketch two considerations in this
respect.
First, careful examination shows that Spiritism does not now experience,
and has never experienced any process of accumulation of anomalies. As we have
seen, in science this process is a pre-requisite for the installation of crises
and paradigm proliferation, and therefore for scientific revolutions. Given
this fact, it is easy to conclude that all the attempts that have been made to
create, in the name of science, new lines of research of the spiritist
phenomena are methodologically premature and unjustifiable, contributing to
hinder rather than to promote the progress of knowledge.
Secondly, given the specific nature of the spiritist theory, one should
not expect that it will be superseded, at least in what concerns its basic
principles. Such principles are very close to the phenomenal level, being
therefore highly stable from a theoretical point of view. Utilising a
philosophical concept, one can classify the spiritist theory as largely phenomenological. The most famous
example of a phenomenological theory in the academic sciences is thermodynamics,
which has developed in the mid nineteenth century, and has since remained
unaltered. It was not shaken when physics underwent the great relativistic and
quantum revolutions, which have radically changed the conception of matter.
This feature of thermodynamics was very appealing to, amongst others, Einstein,
who endeavoured to develop his special relativity theory in phenomenological
moulds.
In non-phenomenological
theories ¾ the so-called constructive theories ¾ , which form the largest part of
physics and chemistry, the degree of “theory” of the principles is much
greater; they are farther removed from the empirical level. The gap between
theory and observation is wider, and the confidence with which the former can
be asserted is correspondingly smaller, as there always are several plausible
alternative principles and theories for the prediction and explanation of the
same phenomena. The history of physics and chemistry illustrates the
vulnerability of their constructive theories.
The fundamental principles of Spiritism, such as the existence,
pre-existence and survival of the spirit, the free-will and the law of cause
and effect, etc., are propositions belonging to the same epistemic category as,
for instance, the propositions that fire burns and hemlock poisons, that Rome
and the Sun exist. Their confirmation depends neither on instruments nor on
high-level risky constructive theories whatsoever. This point has been analysed
by Allan Kardec himself.
Let us take an example. A man must be downright crazy not to conclude
the existence of a friend upon the receipt of a letter of hers commenting
details of their confidential relations, written in her typescript, and
containing her signature. Suppose now the friend is dead and another letter of
the very same kind is delivered, not by the ordinary postman, but by a
psychographic medium. What has changed from the epistemological point of view?
Nothing at all, and the same inference can legitimately be drawn. Now it is
facts and reasonings as straightforward as these that form the scientific basis
of Spiritism.
The class of phenomena that gave rise, and uphold directly the spiritist
paradigm is very broad, including not only the above-mentioned psychographic
communications but also psychophony (oral spirit communication), xenoglossy
(expression in unknown languages), materializations of spirits and objects,
sight and hearing of spirits and things belonging to the spiritual world, and
many others. Besides these specific phenomena (the spiritist phenomena), Spiritism explains, and is therefore
confirmed, by numberless ordinary phenomena concerning human psychic,
physiological and moral characteristics such as sentiments and inclinations,
sympathies and antipathies, some remarkable occurrences of our lives, psychosomatic
effects, psychic pathologies, etc. Those who have been attempting to formulate
non-spiritist sciences of the spirit almost invariably overlook this vast body
of evidence in favour of Spiritism. Worse, even the variety of spiritist
phenomena is not taken into account, and much less explained by a coherent and
heuristically powerful theory.
We have shown elsewhere (Chibeni 1988; see also 1986) that Allan Kardec
had a philosophical sense that was much ahead of his time. He has correctly
identified the features of a genuine science, and carried his research
accordingly. This claim is upheld by both the inspection of his accomplishments
and the many explicit passages of his texts concerning the nature and the
method of science. Contemporary philosophy of science has overwhelmingly
vindicated the Kardequian analyses and procedures, showing where the true
science of spirit really is.
REFERENCES
CHALMERS,
A.F. What is this Thing called Science? St.
Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1978.
CHIBENI,
S.S. Espiritismo e ciência. Esboço de uma análise do Espiritismo à luz da
moderna filosofia da ciência. Reformador,
May 1984, pp. 144-7 e 157-9.
----------.
Os fundamentos da ética espírita. Reformador,
June 1985, pp. 166-9.
----------
. Por que Allan Kardec ? Reformador,
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----------.
Ciência espírita. Revista Internacional
de Espiritismo, March 1991, pp. 45-52.
FEYERABEND,
P.K. Against Method. London, Verso,
1978.
KARDEC, A. Le
Livre des Esprits. Paris, Dervy-Livres.
O Livro dos Espíritos. Transl.
Guillon Ribeiro, 43 ed., Rio de Janeiro, Federação Espírita Brasileira.
----------. L'Évangile
selon le Spiritisme. Rio de Janeiro, Federação Espírita Brasileira, 1979. O Evangelho segundo o Espiritismo.
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----------. Le
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KUHN,
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LAKATOS,
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[1] This text is the English version,
prepared by the Author with some modifications, of the article “O paradigma
espírita”, published in the official journal of the Brazilian Spiritist
Federation, Reformador, June 1994,
pp. 176-80, and is here reproduced with the kind permision of the editor. This
version appeared first in print in Human Nature, vol. 1, n.
2, pp. 82-87, January 1999.
[2] The most representative works of
these philosophers are Kuhn 1970, Lakatos 1970 and Feyerabend 1978. For a
simple exposition of their main ideas, in contrast with the traditional and
Popperian views, see Chalmers 1978.